Introduction
In many markets, service providers operate networks that support the interactions of their customers. Examples include payment systems, telecommunications networks, advertiser-supported media, and social clubs. 1 Absent network interconnection and interoperability, two users must belong to the same network in order to transact with one another. Often, however, a single user can participate in multiple networks. When two users wish to transact with one another and they participate in multiple networks in common, the question arises, who decides which network carries the transaction? The answer is the subject of this paper. 2 An example helps fix ideas. A credit or debit card network can be thought of as facilitating transactions between retail merchants on one side and card-issuing banks or card-holding consumers on the other. 3 A notable feature of the credit and debit card industries is that a typical merchant accepts cards that run over several different networks and a typical consumer holds a portfolio of cards that are collectively capable of running over multiple networks. Indeed, in the United States, at least, many financial institutions issue debit cards where each card is capable of running over multiple networks. Consequently, when a consumer presents his or her debit card to a merchant to make a purchase, it is often possible to complete a given transaction over several different debit networks. This raises the issue of who chooses the specific network used.
The answer depends, in part, on the technology used to authenticate the cardholder at the time of the transaction. The leading authentication methods today are signature and personal identification number (pin). It is estimated that between 65 and 80 percent of debit cards are 1 Settings in which suppliers match two sides of a transaction have become known as two-sided markets. There has been considerable work on two-sided markets in recent years. Notable examples include Armstrong (2004) , Caillaud and Jullien (2001, 2003) , Doyle and Smith (1998) , Hahn (2003) , Hermalin and Katz (2004) , Jeon et al. (2004) , Kim and Lim (2001) , Laffont et al. (2003) , Rochet and Tirole (2003, 2004) , Squire (1973) , and Srinagesh and Gong (1996) . Papers specifically considering the two-sided-market aspects of card payment systems include Schmalensee (2002) , Tieman and Bolt (2003) , Guthrie and Wright (2003) , and the papers discussed by Rochet (2003) in his survey.
2 Like us, Caillaud and Jullien (2001, 2003) and Rochet and Tirole (2003) consider competition between networks. These papers do not, however, focus on the question of routing rules, as they each assume a specific routing rule, which is taken as fixed exogenously. Our focus, instead, is on the endogenous determination of routing rules. Moreover, Caillaud and Jullien and Rochet and Tirole' s papers assume the members of one or both sides of the market have homogenous preferences vis-à-vis the networks. In contrast, much of our attention is on situations in which the members of each side have heterogenous preferences vis-à-vis the networks.
3 Actual debit networks are somewhat more complicated. Financial institutions that issue cards and acquire transactions for merchants are the actual members of a debit network. Cardholders are customers of the card-issuing banks, while merchants are customers of the acquiring banks. Moreover, physical routing decisions may be made by merchant processors, who handle the mechanics of routing transactions. Our simplified setting captures the important economic forces that underlie the routing issue.
both pin and signature enabled, and the choice between modes of authentication is typically made by the consumer, subject to incentives provided by merchants and card issuers. 4 If the consumer chooses signature authorization, then there is no additional network choice because any given card is associated with at most one signature network. But if a consumer chooses to use pin-authentication, then there typically is a second choice to be made. The average merchant location that accepts pin debit accepts the cards of approximately three different pin debit networks. 5 And the average debit card can be run over 1.7 pin debit networks. 6 Hence, when a consumer presents his or her pin debit card, there is often a choice of which pin debit network to use. This choice is determined by contractual agreements between debit networks and their merchant and issuer members, not the debit card holder. 7 The specification of which pin network is used when there are multiple networks available is known as a routing rule.
There are several types of routing rule:
• Issuer Routing: Transactions are routed according to issuer instructions.
• Merchant Routing: Transactions are routed according to merchant instructions.
• Network Routing: A network requires that any transaction that can go over it must go over it; that is, if both the issuer and merchant are affiliated with a network utilizing this routing rule, then they must transact over it. 8 Although not formally a routing rule, it is evident that if a merchant or issuer participates in only one debit network, then that exclusivity has the effect of choosing the routing. 9 Hence, we will also explore the effects of a network's imposing the requirement that a merchant or issuer or both belong uniquely to that network.
Below, we present our model using language appropriate to debit card networks. However, some of the same issue also arises in other contexts. As noted above, for example, merchants often accept the credit cards of multiple networks. Although credit card issuers typically pick a single network for a given card to run over, a consumer may carry multiple credit cards in his or her wallet and choose which card to present when making payment at a merchant. Hence, credit cards networks can be thought of as having cardholder routing. The broader issue of choosing among payment instruments (e.g., cash versus check versus debit card versus credit card) can also be viewed in these terms.
Similar issues arise in communications networks. For example, many people subscribe to both wireline and mobile telephone networks. The costs and benefits of message exchange incurred by the sender and receiver may depend on which network is used to complete a call. In this case, there is caller routing: through his or her choice of the number to dial, the caller determines whether the call is completed over a fixed-line or wireless network. The called party can influence the choice of routing both through his or her network subscription choices and by the choice of how widely to disseminate his or her different telephone numbers.
Routing issues also arise on the Internet because many local Internet service providers (isps) and web-hosting services are connected to multiple Internet backbone service providers. 10 Shipping represents another example of routing choice; sometimes merchants choose the routing, sometimes consumers are given the choice, and the parties have some choice as to which networks they belong (e.g., in the us, a consumer with a post office box has effectively chosen not to belong to the dhl or FedEx networks). Retail stores, which are distribution networks that allow consumers to transact with manufacturers, provide an additional example of routing choices. Lastly, the choice of the word processing program in which to write a collaborative paper on routing rules is a further example in which parties have to choose a common network over which to transact.
As the examples above illustrate, the choice of routing is determined by a combination of routing rules, such as stochastic assignment of routing authority, or a network might offer a menu of routing options rather than a single option as in the text. Suppose, for example, that issuers tended to be of two types: those with medium valuations of both networks and those with a high value of one network and a low value of the other. A network might sort its customers by offering a menu in which issuer routing had a higher transactions price than did network routing. 10 Crémer et al. (2000) provide an analysis of an isp's incentives to connect to multiple Internet backbones.
formal authority (i.e., which party is delegated the right to choose a network), network subscription decisions, and the distribution of information about available options. Our focus is on the interplay between formal authority and subscription decisions. We assume that the party with routing authority (or its agent) knows the set of options available for completing any given transaction. In the payment card industry, consumers rely on point-of-sale signage, and merchants and issuers rely on electronic databases. Similarly, electronic and paper directories are generally available in the telecommunications sector. 11
We characterize users' equilibrium membership decisions for each of the routing rules identified above. Our central finding is that granting formal authority to one side of the market can increase the extent to which transactions run over the network preferred by the other side of the market.
Intuitively, the side that does not have formal authority has stronger incentives to subscribe solely to its preferred network, which trumps the other side's formal authority.
We also characterize the networks' equilibrium choices of routing rules. Our focus is on the case in which all of the routing rules above are available to the networks, as is true of the debitcard industry. We establish conditions under which competing networks adopt routing rules that delegate the choice to one side of the market rather than imposing network routing or exclusivity.
Intuitively, a delegated routing regime serves to get many people on both networks, which lessens the all-or-nothing type of competition that exists with network routing or exclusivity. Moreover, because many people join both networks, the volume of trade is greater.
In some of the industry examples discussed above, not all of the routing options that are logically feasible are technically, legally, or politically feasible. For instance, suppose that a merchant accepts a variety of payment instruments, including cash, checks, and specific brands of credit cards. The merchant typically will lack both the knowledge of which of those payment instruments are held by a given customer and the authority to demand that the customer reveal that information.
Consequently, merchant routing and network routing will be infeasible. Similarly, with retail stores, only consumer routing and manufacturer exclusivity are generally feasible. Nonetheless, the insights of our analysis with respect to the interplay of formal authority and network subscription decisions continue to apply. Moreover, we present a simple normal-form game for routing-rule choices, and one can readily strike rows and columns from this analysis to apply it to specific market settings 11 We note that the decision to have an unlisted mobile or home telephone number can be modeled as choosing not to be on that network for purposes of receiving calls.
with more limited sets of potential routing rules.
Our analysis proceeds as follows. In the next section, we present a simple model of routing choice and network competition. We solve the model working backward in time, beginning with an analysis of consumers' network connection decisions in Section 3. We examine network price competition in Section 4. The choice of routing regime and the equilibrium in the overall game are characterized in Section 5, which also examines the welfare properties of alternative equilibria.
After considering two extensions and one detailed special case of the model in Section 6, the paper closes with a brief concluding section.
A model
Two sides of a market need a network over which to complete a transaction. Let A denote a member of the one side (e.g., a pin debit card issuer) and B denote a member of the other side (e.g., a merchant). Assume the two have been paired and that they wish to conduct a transaction with one another. There are two networks, denoted X and Y , over which transactions can potentially be completed. A and B can actually complete a transaction over a given network only if they both belong to that network.
Let a z and b z denote the gross consumption benefits enjoyed by A and B, respectively, if the transaction is completed over network z, z ∈ {X, Y }. If no transaction is completed, then the payoff to each side is zero.
We assume that the gross benefits, a z and b z , are exogenously fixed. This assumption implies that A and B do not go outside of the arrangements defined by their network contracts by negotiating side payments that depend on the choice of network. 12 This assumption holds when the networks ban such transfers (as some payment networks do) or when parties use the networks to conduct low-value transactions with a large number of trading partners and transaction and bargaining costs would outweigh the potential benefits of inter-user transfers. 13 Consumption benefits are randomly distributed. 14 We assume that (a X , a Y ) ∼ F A on the 12 For an analysis of some of the consequences of relaxing this assumption, see Gans and King (2003) .
13 If A is a card holder and B a merchant, for example, then this assumption implies that the price B charges A for his or her purchase is unaffected by the network used to complete the transaction, which is typically the case in the United States. This assumption also applies to telephone calls between households, where there are typically no direct monetary transfers between callers.
14 In the debit context, different valuations can be interpreted as the extent to which merchants and issuers care about underlying differences in non-price network characteristics, such as consumer perceptions of the networks' The marginal costs of completing a transaction, c, are constant across all transactions and networks. We also assume the networks incur no fixed costs to add members.
It is taken to be common knowledge that the structure of the game is as follows:
1. The networks simultaneously choose their routing rules; specifically each network chooses to have issuer routing, merchant routing, network routing, or to require exclusive network membership. Each network sets a single routing rule (i.e., we don't allow a network to offer different routing rules to different clients or to utilize the choice of routing rule for the purpose of price discrimination). brand names, network reliability and accuracy, and the provision of ancillary services.
15 For expositional convenience we limit attention to non-negative values, but nothing in the analysis relies on this assumption.
16 A more general setup would permit each network to offer menus of routing rules and prices. The well-known difficulties of solving models of competition in menus make such a setup intractable. Moreover, we are unaware of any payment-card network offering different routing rules to different clients or as part of a menu.
17 The total amounts collected by us debit networks through fixed fees levied on merchants and card issuers are very small in comparison with the amounts collected on a per-transaction basis. 
5.
We will refer to a trade that violates (1) as a routing inefficiency. 18 This assumption clearly is reasonable when the party with routing authority directly implements the physical routing (e.g., under merchant routing). When the party with routing authority does not implement the physical routing (e.g., a pin debit network with a network routing rule), we assume there is a monitoring technology that supports enforcement. For example, pin debit networks monitor and analyze merchants' traffic volumes to determine whether these volumes are what would be expected given the population of card holders if merchants were complying with applicable routing rules.
The connection-continuation game
19 Given that we do not allow users A and B to bargain with one another, and that the surplus one side derives from a transaction depends solely on the network and its price, relaxing the assumption would not change equilibrium payoffs or network utilization. It would, however, always have to be stated that users were not joining networks that offered them non-positive surplus or, equivalently, were joining them, but vetoing trade over them. Our assumption that merchants and issuers cannot veto feasible trades mirrors actual practice in payment-card systems.
When s hk > 0, we can define the ratio of the surplus on the lower-surplus network to the highersurplus network for party k:
In what follows, it should be understood that the prices have been set so that there is a positive probability that each of A and B can gain surplus from transacting over either network. That is,
There is never any gain to k from joining network z if s zk ≤ 0. Moreover, joining a network for which s zk ≤ 0 could be distinctly disadvantageous (e.g., when s Xk > 0 ≥ s Y k but the operative routing rule requires that, if the parties are on both networks, trade be on Y ). Given the possibility of trembles by the other party, party k does better not to join network z if s zk < 0 because k can never be assured trade will not go over z. Because even trade that generates positive surplus with small probability beats a certainty of no trade, the possibility of trembles means that a strategy of joining neither network is strictly dominated if a party would derive positive surplus from completing a transaction on one or both networks.
We have established:
(i) If s hk < 0, then party k joins neither network.
(ii) If s hk > 0 > s k , then party k must join network h and not join .
(iii) If s k > 0, party k must join at least one of the two networks.
As we will see, whether k joins X, Y , or both in case (iii) depends on the nature of the routing rules, among other factors. In what follows, we assume that user k stays off network z when s zk = 0 (even if k controls the routing choice) because k can never benefit from joining z. In any case, s zk = 0 is a measure-zero event, and its treatment is immaterial.
One-side-chooses routing
Some routing rules, such as issuer or merchant routing in the pin-debit industry, grant one side of the transaction the right to set the network that will be utilized when both A and B belong to both To analyze B's network membership choice formally, consider the expected value of different choices, making use of A's equilibrium strategy and the distribution of (a X , a Y ). Let α X denote the resulting probability that A joins network X only, α Y the probability that A joins network Y only, and α XY the probability that A joins both networks. B's respective expected payoffs from joining X only, Y only, and both networks are
where λ z is the probability that A has assigned network z priority conditional on A's having chosen to join both networks. By definition, λ X + λ Y ≡ 1.
20 We return to this issue in Section 5 below.
21 The analysis when B is given the authority is symmetric.
It is apparent that B joins both networks if and only if π B XY ≥ π B
h (where h is the network that yields B the higher surplus and is the network that yields B the lower surplus). Using
From this last expression, we see that B should join both networks when B is largely indifferent between them (i.e., r B not too much less than one) or it is relatively likely that A will be on B's less-preferred network only (i.e., α large). Otherwise, B should join only its preferred network to avoid the risk of having to transact on its less-preferred network. Figure 2 illustrates B's strategy as a function of its preferences. The slopes of the rays
respectively (where the slopes derive from expression (2) above).
Proposition 1. If A chooses the routing, then there exists a unique equilibrium of the connectioncontinuation game, which has the following properties: 
Network routing
An alternative regime for network selection when A and B have joined both networks is network routing, under which a network stipulates that, whenever possible, its members must conduct their transactions on it.
If both networks specify network routing, then conflict arises if A and B both subscribe to both networks. Because such conflict would lead to a breach of contract with at least one of the networks, we assume each party signs with at most one network when both networks impose network routing. 23 Observe, however, that if only one network adopts network routing, while the other adopts another routing regime (e.g., merchant routing), then it is possible for a party to join both networks.
22
The figures illustrate the case in which pXA
23 If the parties could somehow coordinate, it would be possible for only one side (say A) to sign with at most one network, while the other side (B) could then sign with both with no risk of breach of contract. That case is, however, identical to a regime in which A is limited to exclusive membership in at most one network, which we consider below in our discussion of one-sided exclusivity.
Both networks adopt network routing
Suppose both networks have adopted network routing. The following lemma indicates that the resulting exclusivity could lead to tipping. When the condition is satisfied, there is no reason for anyone to join network Y given that there is a vanishingly small probability that anyone from the other side of the market will be on that network as a potential trading partner. Observe the condition in Lemma 2 includes the special case in which, with probability one, both A and B derive positive surplus from trade regardless of network. In this case, both an X-only equilibrium and a Y -only equilibrium exist (i.e., the market could tip in favor of either network). Moreover, interior pure-strategy equilibria can exist in addition to the corner equilibria.
We next consider the possibility of equilibria in which both networks obtain members. Specifically, we now assume that
This assumption ensures that there are types of A and B that are realized with positive probability that choose to be on only network X and user types that are realized with positive probability that choose to be on only network Y .
Consider a B for whom s hB > 0. This user's best response is join X if and only if
Recall, α z is the equilibrium probability that A joins z only. From assumption (3) and Lemma 1, α z > 0 for both z. Figure 3 illustrates. The analysis and resulting picture for A are similar.
Observe from Figure 3 that we can conceive of B's best response as being the placement of the ray − − → O U that divides the join-X-only region from the join-Y -only region. Because that ray is always "hinged" at O , placing the ray is equivalent to choosing the angle θ
In the Appendix, we establish:
Proposition 2. Suppose both networks implement network routing and that assumption (3) holds.
Then there is at least one pure-strategy equilibrium of the connection-continuation game. Any pure-strategy equilibrium has the following properties: 
where α z (θ A ) and β z (θ B ) are the probabilities of realizing types of A and B, respectively, who join network z under condition (ii).
As we show by example, in Section 4 below, multiple pure-strategy of the connection-continuation game can exist when both networks adopt network routing.
Observe that the use of network routing can frequently lead to trade inefficiency. Because the two sides of the market have heterogeneous preferences and are forced to make exclusive choices, there can be many instances in which trade would be mutually beneficial, but the two sides have chosen to be on different networks and thus cannot transact.
Routing inefficiency is also possible unless all three of the following conditions are satisfied: (a)
Without conditions (b) and (c), the parties' choices of network will reflect the relative transactions prices of the two networks, rather than solely the gross consumption benefits. Condition (a) is needed to insure that neither A nor B is on its less preferred network. If one were, then routing inefficiency could readily arise. This possibility can be seen by considering types near the 45 • line in Figure 3 .
Only one network stipulates network routing
Now suppose that only one network, say X, stipulates network routing. Whether Y selects an A-chooses regime or a B-chooses regime is irrelevant because, whenever the transaction can go over both networks, the party with the choice must choose X to avoid breaching its contract with that network. 24
In this regime, there cannot be equilibria in which only one network attracts members: If party k thought there were even a minuscule probability the other party would be on the other network (as well or only), then a measure of types of party k bounded away from zero would wish to be on both networks, as the ensuing analysis will confirm. Hence, a one-network-only-has-members equilibrium cannot be the limit of the equilibria as trembles go to zero. Intuitively, users who would get positive surplus from both networks, but prefer X, would never join only Y because joining X too would increase expected surplus if there were any chance that the other side of the market would join X. And users who would get positive surplus from both networks but preferred Y would never join solely network X because there would be positive option value from joining Y too.
In the Appendix, we construct an equilibrium in the connection-continuation game with the following characteristics:
Proposition 3. Suppose that network X stipulates network routing and network Y stipulates either A or B routing. Then, for k = A, B, there exists at least one pure-strategy equilibrium of the connection-continuation game. Any pure-strategy equilibrium has the following properites: 
where α z and β z are the probabilities of realizing types of A and B, respectively, who join only network z under condition (ii); α XY (θ A ) is the probability of realizing types of A who join both networks under conditions (iii) and (v); and β XY (θ B ) is the probability of realizing types of B who join both networks under conditions (iii) and (v). There is an intuition among some debit industry participants that network routing leads to a network's getting a disproportionate share of the transactions because any transaction that could run over that network must run over that network. As we will now show, this intuition is seriously incomplete and, thus, misleading.
Consider the market shares of X and Y when they are otherwise in identical positions. 
where
It is clear that expression (4) and Y charge the same prices as one another, and both distributions of user types are uniform on the unit square, then the equilibrium expected probability of trade is higher on network Y than on
X.
This result is a further illustration of the fact that network membership decisions can override formal authority. Specifically, a user who prefers X but would get positive surplus from a transaction on Y should join both networks because network Y will be used only as a last resort. However, a user that prefers Y may refuse to join X because joining could result in routing over X even when both users are members of Y . Thus, more users join only network Y than join only X.
By assuming that the prices are sufficiently low, we can generalize Corollary 1 to other distributions. and on network Y with probability 3/4. 25
One-sided exclusivity
As already discussed, either A or B may choose to join only one of the two networks, and this exclusivity becomes a de facto routing rule. The networks could also require exclusivity as a condition of joining a network. Were one or both networks to require exclusivity of both sides of the market, the resulting continuation game would be identical to the game analyzed above in 25 This logic can be extended to symmetric distributions for which Pr{aX = aY }, or Pr{bX = bY }, or both are positive. Using the fact that Pr{aX > aY } = Pr{aX < aY } = 1 /2(1 − Pr{aX = aY }), one can show that network Y will complete more of the transactions unless at least √ 2 − 1 = .41 of user types are indifferent between the two networks.
which both networks stipulate network routing. Hence, in this subsection, we restrict attention to continuation games in which one or both of the networks requires exclusive relationships with only one side of the market. In the debit card industry, for example, merchants typically accept cards issued on many networks, but card issuers are sometimes given incentives to issue cards on only one debit network.
There are three cases to consider:
1. Both networks require exclusivity of the same side of the market (e.g., issuers).
2. One network requires exclusivity of A and the other requires exclusivity of B.
3. One network requires exclusivity of one side and the other network adopts one of the alternative routing rules.
In case 2, each side must choose only one network. Recall that, when both networks stipulate network routing, we assume that each user joins at most one network in order to avoid possible breach of contract. Hence, case 2 is equivalent to the continuation game in which both networks stipulate network routing, which was analyzed above.
In case 3, the user on one side of the market cannot belong to both networks. Hence, the routing regime choice of the network that doesn't require exclusivity is irrelevant. In particular, the situation is equivalent to one in which both networks require exclusivity of that side of the market: cases 1 and 3 yield the same continuation game. 26
Consider case 1. Without loss of generality, suppose that both networks require A to make an exclusive choice of network. Given the prospect of trembles by A, B's strategy must be to join any network for which s zB > 0 and not to join any network for which s zB < 0. Observe that this strategy is optimal regardless of A's strategy. 27 Figure 5 illustrates. Given B's strategy, A chooses the network that maximizes its expected surplus using the probabilities induced by B's strategy and distribution of types. That is, A compares (β X + β XY )s XA 26 Observe that this equivalence is a consequence of our assumption that there are only two networks. Suppose, for example, that there were three networks, X, Y , and Z, and that only X imposed exclusivity. Then a user might choose to belong to both Y and Z. This possibility raises issues similar to those addressed in the literature on network compatibility, in which some sets of networks may be compatible with each other while others are not. See, for example, Katz and Shapiro (1985) and Crémer et al. (2000) .
27 Also observe that B's strategy is the same as it would be if B chose the routing. The reason is that, in both cases, the transaction would be routed over B's less preferred network only when that was the sole available means of completing the transaction. Figure 6 illustrates. The slope of the ray
This pair of strategies constitutes the unique equilibrium in the connection-continuation game:
Proposition 4.
(i) Suppose either that (a) one or both networks require exclusivity from both sides of the market;
or (b) one network requires exclusivity of A and the other requires exclusivity of B. Then the continuation game is equivalent to the game when both networks stipulate network routing and its equilibrium is described by Proposition 2.
(ii) Suppose that one or both networks requires exclusivity solely from A and neither network requires exclusivity from B. Then there exists a unique equilibrium of the connectioncontinuation game, which has the following properties:
(a) B joins any network for which s zB > 0; and joins no network for which s zB ≤ 0; and Because B can be on both networks in Part (ii), there is greater trade than there would be under full exclusivity at a given set of prices.
Network pricing
The analysis in the previous section, particularly Proposition 4, Part (i), revealed that there are only five possible continuation games: To solve for the equilibrium routing regime, we first must solve for the equilibrium of the pricing game taking the routing rules as given. We focus on pure-strategy equilibria. Recall that we did not consider game (b) above because it is unclear how the conflicting routing rules would be reconciled.
Rather than solve for equilibrium profits for game (b) in the present section, we will consider three possibilities when we address routing-rule choices in the next section.
Although the setup of the model is straightforward, determining the equilibria of the pricing games is made difficult by the fact that the equilibria of the continuation games depend on the distribution functions, which have heretofore been arbitrary. Even if functional forms are assumed for the distribution functions, calculation of analytic, closed-form equilibrium demands in the continuation games is difficult. Hence, in what follows, we have employed Mathematica to calculate the pricing-game equilibria for specific distributions. 28 We now assume that each user's gross consumption benefits are uniformly distributed on the unit square and the per-transaction cost lies between 0 and 2. Table 1 In an A-chooses routing regime, there is a symmetric Nash equilibrium of the pricing game Table 2 , p A > p B , although the difference in the two prices decreases as the transaction cost, c, increases. Intuitively, not having the routing choice makes B's network membership decision more price sensitive ceteris paribus; hence competition for B is fiercer, which leads B to be charged less in equilibrium.
When X is the only network to stipulate network routing, there is an asymmetric Nash equilibrium of the pricing game in which the networks set different prices, but each network sets the same price to both sides of the market (i.e.,
For the games in which the transaction cost is low (i.e., c < .35), p X > p Y . But for games with 28 The Mathematica programs used here and below can be downloaded from: http://faculty.haas.berkeley.edu/ hermalin/. We calculated prices and profits for more values of c than shown in Tables 1 and 2 . The additional results were omitted for the sake of brevity and are consistent with those reported here. high transaction costs (i.e., c ≥ .35), p X < p Y . Regardless of transaction costs, the network without a network-routing requirement earns greater expected profits than does the network with the network-routing requirement. As Corollary 1 suggests, X carries less traffic in expectation than does Y , which translates into smaller expected profits for X.
The game in which both networks stipulate network routing does not have a pure-strategy equilibrium in the pricing game when transaction costs are low (i.e., c < 1). The reason is that, when prices are low and similar, the connection-continuation game has multiple equilibria. For instance, if p zk = 1/4 for all z and k, then the connection-continuation game has three equilibria:
(1) tan(θ A ) = tan(θ B ) = 2/3; (2) tan(θ A ) = tan(θ B ) = 1; and (3) tan(θ A ) = tan(θ B ) = 3/2.
In terms of Figure 3, lead to large changes in market share. This tension puts pressures on both networks to undercut on price. However, were prices too low, a network would rationally "stop competing" and seek rents from its loyal consumers. But if a network were to exploit its loyal customers, the other network's best response would be to raise prices, starting the "cycle" over.
For high enough transaction costs (i.e., c ≥ 1), a symmetric pure-strategy equilibrium exists for the pricing game when both networks stipulate network routing. Both networks charge the same price to both sides of the market (i.e., p zk ≡ p for all z and k). When prices are high enough, there is a unique pure-strategy equilibrium of the kind described in Proposition 2. The pricing game then becomes a well-behaved game between differentiated duopolists. Because of exclusivity, competition is fiercer between the networks than in the other routing regimes. This and the lower volume of trade result in much lower profits when both networks stipulate network routing than in the other continuation games.
Finally, the one-side exclusivity game results in a symmetric equilibrium:
Moreover, p A and p B tend to be nearly equal.
The choice of routing regime
Using Table 1 , and assuming a payoff for the case of conflicting routing rules, we can solve for the choice of routing regime when the distributions are uniform and c ≥ 1. Figure 7 presents the routing-regime game in normal form. From Table 1 , we have Π A > max{Π E , Π NO } and
Above, we did not analyze the pricing game in which one network chooses issuer routing and the other chooses merchant routing because it was unclear how the conflicting routing rules would be reconciled. Here, we consider three alternatives. One is that reconciliation would entail very significant transaction costs, possibly including litigation costs. Under this assumption, Π D (expected profit when the networks impose incompatible routing rules) would be the lowest payoff.
Alternatively, conflicting assignments of formal authority could result in de facto authority going to the party that actually implements the physical routing. 29 Under this assumption, the payoffs when one network chooses issuer routing and the other chooses merchant routing are identical to the payoffs when both networks choose merchant routing. 30 Thirdly, the conflicting routing rules could, as in the network-routing regime, induce each user to sign exclusively with one network to avoid the adverse consequences of conflicting routing rules. Under this alternative, the game would be equivalent to network routing. In summary, under any of these three assumptions,
Inspection of Figure 7 establishes the following result. (ii) Both networks require exclusivity of a common side of the market, but not of the other side.
The networks Pareto prefer an equilibrium in which one side is delegated the authority to choose routing to an equilibrium with one-sided exclusivity. 31
29 Something similar occurs in the pin debit industry: many merchants route transactions over their preferred networks when there is issuer routing but the issuer is recorded as having specified multiple networks as its first choice.
30 In the statement of the next result, we treat these outcomes as equivalent and refer only to the outcome in which both networks delegate authority to the same side of the market. We are unaware of any circumstances in which debit networks have offered conflicting routing regimes.
31 Although the uniform-distribution version of our model predicts that networks should adopt issuer routing (or, possibly, merchant routing), some debit networks actually use network routing. At least in the United States, network routing may be a holdover from the evolution of automated teller machine networks-for which network routing was prevalent-into point-of-sale debit networks. Moreover, in recent years, an increasing number of networks have implemented issuer routing. Table 3 reports the results based on formulas derived in the Appendix. Expected welfare is greater in a one-side-chooses equilibrium than in a one-side-exclusivity equilibrium. Hence, the equilibrium preferred by the networks (see Proposition 5) is also the expected-welfare-maximizing equilibrium.
One can also examine welfare in cases where the choice of routing regime is restricted either by technological constraints or by regulation that sets the routing regime but does not constrain the networks' pricing decisions. Hence, the full ranking of welfare outcomes is of interest. Calculations show that, in our example, one-side-chooses is the regime that maximizes welfare, a single network's stipulating network routing is second, one-side exclusivity is third, and both networks' stipulating network routing is the regime that results in the lowest welfare level.
Additional cases
We next consider two extensions and one detailed case of our baseline model.
The deciding party pays
It is of some practical interest to consider the effects of a rule requiring that, if one side of the market gets to choose the network, then the other side of the market faces a price of zero. This rule, for instance, has been applied to mobile telephony. Specifically, federal regulators in the United States do not allow calling-party-pays billing when the receiver is a mobile user. In large part, the rationale for this prohibition is that the called party is the one who has made the choice among wireless carriers. 32 As has been well established by the literature on pricing in two-sided markets, it generally is not efficient to set the price paid by one side of the market to 0. 33 Moreover, a requirement that only the party with routing control be the one to pay for the service can induce 32 Observe, however, that, if the calling party is familiar with the called party's telephone numbers, then one could just as well prohibit called-party-pays billing on the grounds that the calling party chooses the carrier (routing) by deciding to dial the wireless number instead of the wireline one.
33 See, for example, Jeon et al. (2004) , Kim and Lim (2001) , and Hermalin and Katz (2004) . Doyle and Smith (1998) focus on the issue with particular regard to mobile telephony. networks to choose a different routing regime than they would under a policy of laissez-faire.
The potential adverse profit and welfare effects of a chooser-pays rule are readily seen by considering the following limiting case. Suppose regulation requires that, if network z implements an A-chooses routing rule, then it must set p zB = 0. Observe that, if c exceeds the maximal value of A's willingness to pay, then the profits associated with letting A choose the network are zero because there is no trade. A regime under which the costs of a transaction can be shared between the two parties, however, may allow profitable trade to occur. Specifically, consider our case in which user types are uniformly distributed on the unit square. As c goes to one, the profits associated with either issuer or merchant routing go to zero, but other routing regimes remain profitable.
Straightforward computations show that, for all c ∈ (1 − δ, 2), for some δ > 0, Π A < Π NO .
Moreover, for all c ∈ (1, 2), Π AO < Π E .
Proposition 6. Suppose that each user's gross consumption benefits are distributed uniformly on the unit square and the transaction cost, c, is in (1, 2). Then the pure-strategy equilibria of the routing-rule game with a chooser-pays regulatory requirement are:
(i) One network chooses network routing and the other network chooses either A exclusivity or B exclusivity.
(ii) Both networks require exclusivity of a common side of the market, but not of the other side.
These equilibria all have the same connection-continuation game and give rise to identical outcomes in terms of equilibrium prices, transactions quantities, profit, and welfare.
Coupled with Proposition 6, the rankings in Table 3 imply the following: 34 Corollary 3. Chooser-pays regulation results in lower equilibrium profits and welfare relative to the networks' Pareto-preferred equilibrium absent a chooser-pays requirement.
34 In applying Proposition 6 and the results of Table 3 , we are assuming that the calling party would know which network was being used to complete the call and what price was being charged to the calling party. At least some us policy makers would require telecommunications carriers to use automated voice prompts to provide this information to callers as a condition for being able to implement any form of calling-party-pays pricing. We also ignore the effects of inter-carrier payments (e.g., termination charges) when the calling and called party are on different, interconnected networks.
A Hotelling special case
Many analyses in the two-sided markets literature have employed Hotelling models of product differentiation (e.g., Armstrong, 1998; Laffont et al., 1998a,b; Rochet and Tirole, 2003) . 35 In what follows, it is useful to observe that, by Lemma 1, if min{p Xk , p Y k } ≥ 1/2, then user k will never elect to be on both networks.
Suppose that either A has the choice of routing or B is the only side required to be exclusively on one network. The transaction volume on network X is
Because a is distributely uniformly, λ X = λ Y = 1/2. Substituting for α X and α XY ,
Consider the case in which B is required to be exclusive (so β XY ≡ 0). Our focus is on symmetric equilibria of the pricing game. Observe that, because
When user B has preferences (b, 1 − b), it joins network X if and only if
35 Unlike the analysis here, these models do not allow for endogenous routing. There are other differences as well. For instance, Laffont et al. (1998a,b) allow for two-part tariffs, whereas we consider only simple pricing. In addition, in their models of telecommunication networks, Armstrong (1998) and Laffont et al. (1998a,b) consider a situation in which each party conducts multiple transactions (e.g., makes multiple phone calls).
36 Recall, by Proposition 4(ii)-with the roles of A and B reversed-that A will join any network that offers it surplus, so its decision is unaffected by the prices charged to B.
Hence,
We first show that there cannot be a symmetric equilibrium in which both p B < 1/2 and p A < 1/2. Suppose to the contrary and consider network X's profits if it deviates from the candidate symmetric equilibrium by raising p B by ε:
which, substituting for β X , equals
Because the networks are in equilibrium, it must be that ∂Π X /∂ε |ε=0 = 0. But Additional continuation games are analyzed in the Appendix. Summarizing this analysis:
Proposition 7. Suppose that user preferences have been generated by the Hotelling model (i.e.,
• both networks implement k-chooses routing; or
• at least one network requires k , k = k, to be exclusive and neither network requires k to be exclusive; or
• one network adopts network routing and the other adopts either k-chooses or k -chooses routing;
then the following is the unique pure-strategy, symmetric equilibrium:
(ii) if c > 1/2, then the equilibrium prices are
Equilibrium profits and welfare are the same across the routing regimes.
The intuition for why identical outcomes hold across three different routing regimes (in contrast to the analysis in Section 5) is the now familiar idea that membership decisions can trump formal authority. As shown above, the networks always set prices greater than or equal to 1/2 for at least one side of the market, say B. Given such prices, no type of B can have positive surplus levels from both networks at once. Therefore, A's choice of network and, thus, the networks' pricing to A have no effect on B's choice of network. Moreover, given that B makes an exclusive network choice,
A has no reason not to join all networks that yield it positive surplus, regardless of the routing rules; B's choice of network faces A with an all-or-nothing choice with regard to which network will handle the transaction if one takes place. Thus, when a network changes its price to A, there is no effect on the other network's sales. In this regard, the two networks act as monopolists under all three routing regimes when setting their prices to A.
If the networks require exclusivity of both sides, then it can be shown that the equilibrium prices are
Because, as noted previously, once one side is exclusive, a network need not care whether members of the other side join the rival network (only whether they join it), it follows that the networks must be better off with the equilibrium pricing in Proposition 7 when c ≤ 1/2 than with the prices in (8). That is, consistent with the results in Section 5, double-sided exclusivity is not the optimal routing regime for the networks (at least when cost is low).
When cost is high enough in a Hotelling model (i.e., c > 1/2), Proposition 7 and expression (8) reveal that the routing regime doesn't matter. Once cost is high enough, it is never in a network's interest to price low enough to induce a user to join it when the user intrinsically prefers the other network (e.g., for high c, network X will never find it profitable to induce user A to join X if a Y > a X ). Manifestly, if no one is ever on both networks, then routing regime is irrelevant.
The congruence of prices and profits in the Hotelling version of our model across routing regimes (the three regimes in Proposition 7 and all four regimes if c > 1/2) contrasts with the results when types are uniformly distributed on the unit square (see Tables 1 and 2 ). This suggests that analyses of Hotelling models of two-sided markets should be viewed in perspective; the high degree of differentiation in such models can lead to extreme outcomes (e.g., here, it results in one side's always being exclusive).
Rent dissipation in the absence of product differentiation
Our analysis has heretofore been restricted to the case of symmetric user preferences with product differentiation. We now examine equilibrium when users do not perceive intrinsic differences between the two networks. Specifically, we ask whether there exist pure-strategy equilibria in which networks earn positive profits.
The answer is "no" when there is no product differentiation on either side of the market and at least one side joins any network that offers it positive surplus (i.e., one-side-chooses routing or one-side exclusivity). To see why, suppose, to the contrary, that p e XA , p e XB , p e Y A , and p e Y B are equilibrium prices and that at least one of the networks earns positive profits. Let A be the side that is willing to join both networks (i.e., A has the routing choice or B is the only side that must be exclusive). Moreover, label the networks so that X's profits are at least as large as Y 's. Now, suppose that Y were to deviate from the candidate equilibrium by charging
where ε is an arbitrarily small positive number. Then any A on network X will also be on Y and user B can, thus, rationally choose to be exclusively on Y . In equilibrium, all transactions go over network Y . It is readily shown that, for sufficiently small choices of ε, the deviation would raise network Y 's profits. Therefore, any prices that yield positive profits cannot constitute a pure strategy equilibrium when there is no intrinsic differentiation of the two networks.
If one network stipulates network routing, while the other does not, then this simple undercutting argument still applies, but is somewhat more involved. Suppose, first that X, the network earning weakly greater profits, is the one that stipulated network routing. If Y undercuts as above, then, neither side would join X exclusively. From expression (A5), that means that the dividing ray between "join Y only" and "join both" (see Figure 4) When both networks impose network routing, simple undercutting arguments are insufficient because one must account for how A and B form beliefs about who is on which network following out-of-equilibrium pricing by one of the networks (a point also made by Caillaud and Jullien, 2001, among others) . On the other hand, if, as seems reasonable in this context, A and B believe that they should join the network that charges a lower price to both sides, then the same undercutting argument again rules out pure-strategy equilibria in which one or both networks earn positive expected profits.
When both networks stipulate network routing in a setting without differentiation, there exists an equilibrium in which both networks charge the same prices, p A and p B = c − p A , but all traffic is on just one of the networks, say X. Indeed, except for the knife-edge case in which each network attracts exactly half of each side, the only pure-strategy equilibria must exhibit this tipping. 37
It is also interesting to ask what happens when users on one side of the market consider the networks to be differentiated, but users on the other side do not. Suppose, for example, that A's type is uniformly distributed on the unit square, while B's type is uniformly distributed on the forty-five degree line from (0, 0) to (1, 1). Further suppose that the per-transaction cost lies between 0 and 2. A reasonable hypothesis might be that network price competition to attract B would dissipate any profits that might be earned as the result of the differentiation perceived by A. This hypothesis need not hold, however, because the networks endogenously differentiate themselves from B's perspective by differentially attracting the various types of A.
Under a B-chooses regime, for example, numerical calculations show that the networks charge equal equilibrium prices to the two sides. 38 That is, even though B is indifferent between the two 37 Hermalin and Katz (2004) consider how the cost c should be optimally split between pA and pB in situations such as this. 38 We assume that B chooses the routing by tossing a fair coin when pXB = pY B.
networks and B is the side that nominally chooses the network, competition is just as strong to attract A as B. Moreover, the price is not driven to cost, so that firms earn positive equilibrium profits. Product differentiation on one side of the market is enough to create differentiation on both sides because, even though B does not distinguish different underlying network characteristics, the two networks do offer B access to different sets of user types on the other side of the market. Hence, a small reduction in p zB will not lead to a discontinuous jump in sales for network z because highvalue types of B will remain on both networks in order to be able to trade with types of A that have joined only one network.
In an A-chooses regime, user A pays a higher equilibrium transactions price than does B. 39 As in the B-chooses regime, the sum of the prices charged to the two sides of the market exceeds costs, and the networks earn positive equilibrium profits.
Conclusion
We have examined the choice of routing rules for a set of situations in which two networks compete for business. The principal motivating example is pin debit networks, but other networks, including payment, retail, and communications networks, raise similar issues.
The central insight from analysis of the connection-continuation game is that membership decisions can override formal rules and lead to counterintuitive equilibrium outcomes. Thus, transactions tend to be routed over B's preferred network when A is given the formal authority to choose the routing. Similarly, for some distributions of user types, a network that imposes network routing in an otherwise symmetric setting will have a lower market share than its rival. Intuitively, a user who cannot choose the routing has greater incentives to join solely its preferred network than does a user that can choose the routing.
Our main result for the overall game establishes conditions under which competing networks should adopt routing rules that give one side of the market control of the routing choice (Proposition 5). Intuitively, such a routing regime gives one side incentives to join both networks, which lessens the all-or-nothing competition that would exist with network routing. Moreover, because many people join both networks, the volume of trade is greater (i.e., the likelihood of a trade inefficiency is reduced). This equilibrium is also welfare maximizing relative to the other routing 39 For other routing rules, no pure-strategy equilibria exist.
regime, exclusivity, that can be sustained as an equilibrium of the routing-choice game.
Clearly work remains to be done. There are several profitable extensions to consider. One is networks that are asymmetrically positioned in terms of costs, consumer preferences, or installed bases. Intuitively, such cases might be more likely to give rise to equilibria in which the "leading" network imposes an exclusivity or network routing requirement in order to capitalize on its superior position.
Second, it would be interesting to consider situations in which networks use more sophisticated forms of pricing, such as a combination of membership fees and per-transactions charges. It is readily seen that-holding users' network membership decisions fixed-allowing non-uniform pricing schemes would matter only when applied to a party with formal routing authority. Under issuer routing, for example, a merchant has no discretion once it has made its network membership choices. Thus, any two price schedules that give rise to the same expected payment are equivalent from the merchant's perspective. Issuer behavior, however, could be affected by the mix of fixed and variable fees. Moreover, the pricing structure could affect all users' network membership decisions (e.g., the use of fixed fees would reduce a user's incentives to join multiple networks).
Third, and related to the last point, one could explore a richer set of contracts or mechanisms for the networks to offer. As noted previously, we have focussed on the set of contracts most applicable to the payment-card industry. While simple extensions, for instance random-routing rules, would be straightforward, defining the overall set of feasible contracts is difficult. For instance, the operable rules and prices could be made dependent on the choices of both sides of the transaction (e.g., user
A faces one tariff and routing rule from network X if user B has selected a given option offered by X, but A faces a different tariff and routing rule if B has selected another option). Moreover, each network could make its terms dependent on the terms offered by the other network. 40 Presumably, at some point, the transaction costs imposed by complex rules limits the degree of complexity in the menus offered.
Lastly, it could be useful to characterize mixed-strategy equilibria for those continuation games in which pure-strategy equilibria don't exist.
40 For a general analysis of the implications of interdependent contracts, see Katz (in press ).
Proof of Proposition 2
Let Θ k (·) be party k's best response function. Consider Θ A (·). B's strategy, θ B , defines the regions join-X-only and join-Y -only and, thus, the probabilities β X and β Y . From above,
Because the underlying distribution is continuous, β X (·) and β Y (·) are continuous, as is their ratio.
It follows that Θ A (·) is continuous. It is also readily shown to be increasing. By assumption (3) and Lemma 1, β X (·) and β Y (·) are bounded away from zero for all
Using expression (A2) and the corresponding analysis for B, we know the best-response curves will resemble those shown in Figure 8 , at least with respect to their end points. These end points and the functions' continuity guarantee that the functions cross; hence, an equilibrium exists.
Proof of Proposition 3
From assumption (3),
As before, party k joins neither network if s hk ≤ 0 and joins only network h if s hk > 0 ≥ s k .
The only case remaining, therefore, is s k > 0. Consider A's decision. 41 When s A > 0, the payoffs 
Figure 4 illustrates A's strategy. The fraction in expression (A4) is the slope of the ray
divides the join-Y -only region from the join-both region. The angle θ is, thus, the arctan of that fraction. Observe that θ is greater than forty-five degrees for any β X > 0. Types in the region between the forty-five degree ray and the θ ray would prefer that the transaction take place over network Y , and joining X risks having the transaction routed over that network even though A and B both are on Y as well. However, the benefit to these A-types of joining network X is that it allows them to transact with B-types that join only X.
Let Ω k (·) be party k's best-response function. Consider Ω A (·) (the analysis for B is symmetric).
B's strategy θ B defines the join-both region and, thus, the probability β XY . From (A4),
Because the underlying distributions are continuous, β XY (θ B ) is continuous, and, thus, so too is the argument of arctan in (A5). Hence, Ω A (·) is continuous. It is readily shown to be decreasing
As the above analysis demonstrated (see also Figure 4 
Because
Hence, Ω A (·) and Ω B (·) will resemble those shown in Figure 9 -at least with respect to their end points. That and their continuity guarantees that they cross; hence, an equilibrium exists.
Welfare calculations
Define g z = a z +b z as total gross consumption benefits if trade occurs on network z. Because a z and b z are independently distributed uniformly on [0, 1], g z has the following density and cumulative distribution functions, respectively:
Expected welfare under first-best routing is
Tedious calculations demonstrate that
Expected welfare under A-chooses routing is
where the factor of 2 reflects that trade is equally likely on either network in the symmetric equilibrium of the pricing game.
Expected welfare under A-exclusivity routing is
where, again, the factor of 2 reflects that trade is equally likely on either network in the symmetric equilibrium of the pricing game and the tildes are a reminder that the probabilities are different than in a one-side-chooses regime.
Remainder of proof of Proposition 7
Consider the pricing game when X has stipulated network routing and Y permits either issuer or merchant routing. Because of a user's obligation under X's network routing stipulation, being that is, Y doesn't wish to deviate downward. If X drops its price to B by ε from 1/2, then it gains fewer than ε B types (some types who would now enjoy positive surplus trading over X prefer to remain solely on Y because s Y B is sufficiently greater than s XB ). It also loses some types of A that were on both networks, because they respond to the increase in β XY by quitting network X.
Hence, as with Y , the limited gain in sales does not compensate for the drop in price. Network X therefore doesn't wish to deviate downward from p XB = 1/2 either. For c > 1/2, neither network would find it in its interest to price so low that some types wish to join both networks; that is, the networks are essentially monopolists to their ends of the linear city and p A = p B = (1 + c)/3 are readily shown to be the profit-maximizing monopoly prices. .1481 × 10 
